Access audit of baresql_fx_saas
21 October 2026, 09:00 UTC · PostgreSQL 16.15 (Ubuntu 16.15-0ubuntu0.24.04.1) · 1 login · BareSQL 0.1.0
0high
1medium
1low
1logins that read personal data
5columns with personal data
BareSQL logged in as postgres (a superuser) over an unencrypted connection and read the system catalogs inside one read-only transaction.
It read up to 200 rows of each table to see what the columns hold; the values were looked at in memory and are not in this report.
For every login, the server's own privilege checks were asked about every table and column, and each answer below comes with the grant, membership, ownership or view that gives it.
Findings
MEDIUMRow security on app.audit_log is not forced and its owner saas_migrator can log in: sessions logged in as saas_migrator see every row.
LOWRow security is on for app.api_keys but it has no policies: only its owner and roles that bypass row security see any rows.
Who can read personal data
| Login | Personal data | Columns | Tables | Changes | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| saas_agent | email addressperson's name | 2 | 1 | 0 |
Personal data in this database
| Column | Holds | How BareSQL knows | Read by |
|---|---|---|---|
| app.accounts.email | email address | 30 of 30 sampled values are email addresses | saas_agent |
| app.accounts.full_name | person's name | the column name suggests person's name | saas_agent |
| app.accounts.phone | phone number | 30 of 30 sampled values are phone numbers | |
| app.api_keys.api_key | key, token or secret | 3 of 3 sampled values look like random tokens; 3 of 3 sampled values contain a key or token | |
| app.audit_log.actor_email | email address | 20 of 20 sampled values are email addresses | |
| support.ticket_context.email | email address | comes from app.accounts.email | saas_agent |
| support.ticket_context.full_name | person's name | comes from app.accounts.full_name | saas_agent |
| support.ticket_context_invoker.email | email address | comes from app.accounts.email | saas_agent |
| support.ticket_context_invoker.full_name | person's name | comes from app.accounts.full_name | saas_agent |
Logins
saas_agent
| Personal data it can read | Holds | How |
|---|---|---|
| app.accounts.email | email address |
|
| app.accounts.full_name | person's name |
|
| support.ticket_context.email | email address |
|
| support.ticket_context.full_name | person's name |
|
| support.ticket_context_invoker.email | email address |
|
| support.ticket_context_invoker.full_name | person's name |
|
17 other columns it can read
| Column | How |
|---|---|
| app.accounts.id |
|
| app.tickets.id |
|
| app.tickets.tenant_id |
|
| app.tickets.account_id |
|
| app.tickets.subject |
|
| app.tickets.body |
|
| app.tickets.created_at |
|
| support.invoice_summary.id |
|
| support.invoice_summary.amount |
|
| support.ticket_context.id |
|
| support.ticket_context.subject |
|
| support.ticket_context_invoker.id |
|
| support.ticket_context_invoker.subject |
|
| support.ticket_list.id |
|
| support.ticket_list.subject |
|
| support.ticket_overview.id |
|
| support.ticket_overview.subject |
|
2 columns it may select that give it nothing today
| Column | How |
|---|---|
| app.invoices.id |
|
| app.invoices.amount |
|
Everyone (PUBLIC)
What every role can read, including roles created after this audit.
No personal data is open to every role.
Method
Schemas audited: app, public, support. Connection: postgres://[email protected]:5432/baresql_fx_saas, login method md5.
BareSQL never calls a function written in SQL or a procedural language, never reads views or foreign tables, and never writes. Sampled values are turned into text by their type's own output function, never by a cast, and each table is read on its own, without its partitions or child tables. Views are traced to the columns they read from their stored definitions, without running them.
Every fact in this report is also in audit.json, which baresql diff and baresql audit --baseline compare with a later audit.